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Abilities and Knowledge in 
Educational Achievement 
Testing: The Assessment of 
Dynamic Cognitive 
Structu res 1 
Samuel Messick 
Educational Testing Service 
This chapter confronts the question of what role cogniti ve abilities play or ought 
to play in educational achievement testing, which raises the prior question of 
what educational achievement tests are or ought to be . I begin by considering the 
nature of educational achievement as a construct in an attempt to circumscribe 
what achievement tests ought to be rather than by examining extant achievement 
tests that may be variously off target. S imilar consideration is accorded cognitive 
ability as a construct. This distinction between constructs and the imperfect, 
variously contaminated tests that are purported to measure them is a critical 
recurrent theme in these de liberations . Other questions to be briefl y addressed 
concern the role of cogniti ve abilities in the processes of school learning and the 
role of schooling in the development of cognitive abilities. 
STRUCTURES OF KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY 
Educational achievement refers to what an individual knows and can do in a 
spec ified subject area . At issue is not mere ly the amount of knowledge acc umu-
lated but its organization or structure as a functional system for productive 
IThis chapter was presented as part of a Division 15 (Educati onal Psychology) invited sym-
posium on Achievement Testing at the annual meeting of the American Psychologica l Assoc iation, 
Washington , D.C. , August 1982 . 
This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Robert L. Ebe l. His endu ring commitment to the 
improvement of educational measurement as a means of improv ing education is a worthy legacy fo r 
the fie ld. 
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thinking , problem so lving , and creative invention in the subject area as well as 
for further learning. The individual 's structure of knowledge is a critical aspect 
of educational achievement because it facilit ates or hinders what he or she can do 
in the subject area . What a person can do in an area includes a variety of area-
specific skills, such as extracting a square root or parsing a sentence or balancing 
a chemical equation , but also broader cognitive abilities that cut across subject 
areas, such as comprehension , memory retention and retrieval, reasoning, analy-
sis and restructuring, evaluation or judgment , and fluency. 
These broader cognitive ab ili ties contribute to the assembly and structuring of 
knowledge , to the continual reassembly and restructuring of cumulating knowl -
edge, to the accessing and retrieval of knowledge, and to its use in problem 
representation and solution . "Thus achievement," in Snow's (1980a) words, 
" is as much an organization function as it is an acquisition function. And new 
achievement depends as much on transfer of such organization as it does on 
transfer of specific prior facts and skill s [p o 43]. " Because cognitive abilities 
playa central role in both the acquisition and organization functions of educa-
tional achievement, their influence can hardly be suppressed or ignored in educa-
tional achievement testing that assesses knowledge structures. However , their 
role may be reduced in low-level achievement testing that stresses amount of 
in formation alone. Let us next consider the nature of developed knowledge 
structures in more detail and then the nature of developed abilities , before at-
tempting to relate thi s formu lation to other conceptions of educational 
achievement. 
Knowledge Structure as Relational Understanding 
A person's structure of knowledge in a subject area includes not only declarative 
knowledge about substance (or information about what) but also procedural 
knowledge about methods (or information about how) and strategic knowledge 
about alternatives for goal setting and planning (or information about which, 
when , and possibly why). Although the acquisition of declarative and procedural 
knowledge is an explic it goal of typical instruction in most subject areas, strate-
gic knowledge is rarely so and must often be acquired by induction , if at all 
(Greeno, 1980). Despite enormous variability in the effort , the principles and 
generali zations and first-order relations among concepts that provide coherent 
though rudimentary structure to newly acquired knowledge are also often taught 
explicitly . Possible exceptions are likely to occur at the beginning or elementary 
levels of learn ing in a field , where emphasis may be placed on the accumulation 
of a critica l mass of information prior to organizing it. But the more idiosyncratic 
structures that relate newly acquired knowledge to ex istent knowledge structures 
(which sometimes entail s qualitative reorgani zations) and the more complex 
structures that evolve as experti se develops (which frequently entail s qualitative 
reorganizations) are rare ly under instructional control. 
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Knowledge structure basically refers to the structure of re lationships among 
concepts. But as knowledge develops, these structures quickly go beyond classi-
fications of concepts as well as first-order relations among concepts and classes 
to include organized systems of relationships , or schemas. As organizations of 
present knowledge, these schemas provide a context for the comprehension and 
interpretation of objects and events; hence, they profoundly influence the ac-
quisition of new knowledge. Schemas guide the storage and retrieval of knowl-
edge, the generalization and interpretation of ideas, and the initiation and regula-
tion of action (Anderson, Spiro, & Montague, 1977) . Thus, educational 
achievement is not just data driven by the bottom- up processing of incoming 
information but also conceptually driven by top- down assimilation to mental 
schemas or relational structures. Furthermore, as expertise develops , these sche-
mas or relational systems themselves become organized in complex patterns , 
hierarchies, and dynamic networks. These networks are called dynam ic because 
the knowledge structures of experts permit and even facilitate flexible reorga-
nizations for the application of multiple perspectives to problem representation 
and solution . I have more to discuss later about the implications for educational 
achievement testing of the differences between novices and experts and between 
beginning learners and experienced learners in a field . 
In the context of school learning, the development of students' knowledge 
structures may be viewed as an explicit educational objective in its own right. In 
this connection, Scriven (1974) points out that knowledge structures comprise 
"organized relational knowledge," which is what we ordinarily mean by under-
standing, and that implicit in the use of this latter term are a number of affective 
educational goals bearing on the development of attitudes, values , sensitivity, 
and appreciation. As Scriven (1 974) put it , "there are deep reasons from cogni -
tive psychology why understanding almost has to have an affective component, 
reasons which emerge in the verstehen theory of the philosophy of history, in the 
notion of empathy, and in concepts of modelling and role playing [p o 334]." 
Furthermore, affect and personality are intrinsically implicated in knowledge 
structure as a consequence of the individual's psychology of knowledge 
(Tomkins, 1965); that is, what people know and are interested in knowing is a 
function of the kinds of persons they are and especially of their ideologies . 
Moreover, the degree of differentiation and hierarchic integration of the knowl-
edge structure, the permeability of its boundaries, and the flexibility or rigidity of 
its dimensions or compartments are reflective of the individual's personality and 
cognitive style (Messick, 1976, in press). 
This view of educational achievement stresses the assessment of developed 
knowledge structure because it is both a product of earlier learning and at the 
same time is instrumental to, or a vehicle for , subsequent learning. Thus, knowl-
edge structure is central whether the aim of achievement testing is the certifica-
tion of past accomplishment, the diagnosis of present functioning, or the fore-
casting of future attainment. By emphas izing the role of knowledge structure as 
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the representation each learner constructs of a subject area to comprehend tasks 
and events, make sense of new experiences, and plan appropriate actions, this 
view is inherently constructivist in character. It is consistent with a variety of 
constructivi st psychologies but does not derive from anyone of them . For exam-
ple , this view of learn ing and achievement is closely allied to what Bruner has 
called " instrumental conceptualism" (Bruner, Olver, & Greenfield, 1966). It is 
also quite congenial with Piaget's overall stance on developmental process with-
out committing to his position on developmental stages; that is, learn ing and the 
development of cognitive structure are seen as the active assimilation of experi-
ence to conceptual schemas , in balance with the restructuring of schemas in 
accommodation to reality-based or theoretically-correct structures. 
Cognitive Abilities as Process Structures 
Turning now to cognitive ability as a construct, let me stress at the outset that I 
am speaking of multiple abilities and not a unitary force or power , about devel-
oped abilities and not fixed abi lities or capacities (Humphreys , 1962). Indeed, 
these abi lities are clearly sti ll developing well into ad ulthood (Cattell , 1971). 
They may develop more slowly later in learning than earlier and more rapidly for 
some individuals than others . Some may decline with advancing age, sometimes 
being compensated for by increasing facility in the utilization of other abilities. 
But, in general , cognitive abilities appear to respond over the long term to 
education and experience throughout the school years and beyond-even such 
broad intellective abilities as verbal comprehension and quantitative reasoning 
that are relatively well crystall ized by adolescence (Cattell, 1971 ; Messick , 
1980, 1982b). 
Nor is there any implication of innateness of these cognitive ab ilities inherent 
either in the way they are measured or in the way they are theoretically concep-
tualized. At the level of measurement, the drawing of inferences about innate 
abi lity from an individual's test performance has long been discredited. Such 
in ferences drawn by early intelligence testers were based on two unsupportable 
assumptions about equality of motivation to learn and equality of opportunity to 
learn. These early testers reasoned that by selecting skills that all individuals are 
expected to develop as a matter of course in their cu lture, gross differences in 
motivation to learn were avoided ; selecting ski ll s that can be mastered on the 
basis of universally available experiences within the culture avoided gross dif-
ferences in opportunity to learn. Hence, performance differences on tests of 
those skills, they would have it , reflect individual differences in innate ability to 
learn. 
The crucial flaw in this reasoning lies in the premises- ski lls that all exam-
inees have equal motivation and opportunity to acquire probably do not exist 
(Schwarz , 1971). Efforts to satisfy these assumptions continue, however, in the 
gui se of so-called "culture-free" or "culture-fair" tests . Here, the usual ap-
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proach is to select novel tasks where the opportunity (or rather, the lack of 
opportunity) for mastering them is more nearly equivalent in different cultural 
settings. This may better satisfy the opportunity assumption but at the expense of 
the motivation assumption, because tasks that are not emphasized in a culture 
depend for their salience or stimulus value on their intrinsic interest and the 
presumed importance of the testing to each examinee. 
In contrast, the concept of developed abilities stresses the individual's current 
level of consistent proficiency however derived. Individual differences in devel-
oped abilities frankly reflect all sources of ability differences, including indi-
vidual differences in prior motivation and opportunity to learn. Nonetheless, 
direct measures of the student's current functioning level, whatever its multiple 
determinants, are important in their own right for a variety of educational pur-
poses. In much instructional planning, for example, it is critical to know what the 
student can do now. Some instructional strategies may differ, to be sure, depend-
ing on whether current ability levels are thought to reflect deficiencies or difficul-
ties deriving from problems of motivation or of opportunity. In these instances, 
and perhaps as a general rule, measures of developed abilities should be in-
terpreted in the context of independent information about motivation and oppor-
tunity, the latter being conceived broadly enough to include the quality of prior 
and current instruction (Heller, Holtzman, & Messick, 1982; Messick, 1983). 
At the level of theory, most modern conceptions of ability development are 
basically interactionist in character; that is, they accord a causal role to interac-
tion with the environment and hence are counter to earlier traditions of fixed 
intelligence and of genetically predetermined development (Hunt, 1961; Mes-
sick, 1972). Although many theorists hold that the primitive or rudimentary 
processes that initially interact with the environment are innate, these processes 
are not the abilities that develop out of the interaction. Even in those instances 
where a basic innate ability is postulated to start the interactive process , such as 
Catte ll 's (197 1) fluid intelligence, this ability itself develops as a consequence of 
environmental interaction while it simultaneously facilitates the formation and 
development of specific abilities in response to differentiated environmental 
structure. 
Many of these theories also stress a centra l role for positive transfer in learn-
ing and development. In the theory of ability development elaborated by Fergu-
son (1954, 1956), for example, abilities are viewed as learned proficiencies that 
attain relative stability through overlearning. They develop through repeated 
performance across similar tasks and gradually attain relative stability through 
exercise, challenge, and practice. Note that the reference is to relative stability , 
not fixity- that is, proficiency has developed to that part of the learning curve 
where additional effort yields small though nonzero increments. Learning that 
leads to the development of a particular ability, however, is influenced by prior 
learnings and previously established abilities through mechanisms of transfer. 
Indeed, one should expect that the most critical variables exerting transfer effects 
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on subsequent learning would be abilities- that is, those earlier acquisitions that 
have attained stability in performance. 
The operative transfer function in this regard relates performance on a particu-
lar task, or set of simi lar tasks, both to training on those tasks and to proficiency 
levels on relevant abilities. If the learning period is sufficiently prolonged that 
significant changes in the abilities accumulate as a function of training and 
experience, those changes would also be taken into account. Ferguson (1954) 
maintains that "as the learning of a particular task continues, the abi lity to 
perform it becomes gradually differentiated from, although not necessarily inde-
pendent of, other abilities which facilitate its differentiation [po 110]." Because 
existing abi lities, once developed, thus serve to facilitate the differentiation of 
other specific abi lities, the operation of positive transfer produces positive cor-
relations not only among tasks but among abilities . Thus, positive transfer fur-
nishes a simple rationale for the emergence of broader and broader higher-order 
abilities organizing the primary abilities. This suggests that individuals not only 
develop multiple abilities but organized ability structures as well. It also suggests 
that major gains in intellectual power may not come so much from the further 
honing of already well-developed specific abilities as from their organization into 
more general and widely applicable assemblies of integrated ability complexes. 
Furthermore, an important implication of Ferguson's (1954, 1956) line of 
argument is that consistent differential exposure to various task domains leads to 
differential learning and hence to the emergence of different ability patterns in 
different learn ing environments or different cultures (Irvine, 1969; Lesser, Fifer, 
& Clark, 1965; Stodolsky & Lesser, 1967). One might expect, however, that 
higher-order abi lities , if they indeed reflect general transfer components underly-
ing the mutual facilitation of several primary abilities, would tend to apply across 
a variety of task requirements. Hence, higher-order abilities should appear more 
similar from one cultural group to another than do the more specialized primary 
abilities (MacArthur, 1968; Vernon, 1969). 
Given different learning histories and different learning sty les, it seems likely 
that- although the same basic ability processes may be involved in many differ-
ent tasks- they may be strategically used more or less frequently in different 
tasks by different persons. Ability processes may also be organized and deployed 
in different ways for performing the same task, with attendant variation in 
effectiveness. This has led some investigators , such as Simon (1976) and Snow 
(l980b) , to emphasize the assembly and control funct ions of abilities and abi lity 
structures. 
For Gui lford as for Ferguson, transfer also plays a critical role in abi lity 
development. Guilford (1967) claims that' 'the brain is apparently predesigned 
to perform in five major ways [po 417]" corresponding to the five information-
processing operations of cognition or comprehension, memory, convergent pro-
duction, divergent production, and evaluation that comprise the heart of his 
factorial model of the structure of intellect. Specific intellectual abilities develop 
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through the repeated use of these five operations to process information in the 
individual's environment, which Guilford's extensive empirical investigations 
suggest is so structured as to contain 24 types of information generated by the 
cross-classification of four types of content (figural, symbolic, semantic, behav-
ioral) and six types of form or product (units , classes , relations , systems, trans-
formations, implications). 
In Gui lford 's (1967) view , these specific abilities are generali zed ski lls or 
habits that develop through transfer effects occurring by virtue of similarities in 
the task-to-task activities of a particular operation-content- product type. How 
well any specific ability develops depends on how much and how effectively the 
individual exercises the requisite operation in relation to the particular con-
tent- product combination. This in turn depends on the opportunities the person's 
environment offers to operate on such combinations and the individual's needs to 
cope with those offerings . Because tasks within the same operation- content-
product category are more simi lar in shared activities than those in different 
categories, a specific ability should eventually develop via transfer for every cell 
of the operation by content by product cross-classification . This would yield the 
120 abilities in Guilford's structure of intellect. Moreover, because simi larities in 
shared activities may cut across content- product differences for a given opera-
tion such as memory or across operation- product differences for a given content 
such as figura l, higher-order abilities such as general memory facility or general 
figural facility may also emerge (Guilford, 1981 ; Messick , 1973). 
Cattell 's ( 1971) theory of ability development is especiall y pertinent to issues 
of educational achievement because he explicitly stresses not only the role of 
transfer processes in development but the transfer power of developed abi lities in 
task performance. Originating in the investment of innate fluid intelligence in the 
learning of particular tasks or task domains, specific task ski ll s become inte-
grated into primary abi lities that cut across simi lar or related tasks. That is , 
because of an inherent simi larity in the required activities in a particular domain , 
a unity of functioning develops--or in Cattell's (1971) words , "a coherent set of 
habit ski lls, know ledge, conceptual developments, and tactical and strategic 
' know how ' [p o 319]," These primary abi lities, which Cattell calls "agencies," 
become organized through their mutually facilitative transfer effects and shared 
investments of fluid intelligence into higher-order abilities. 
Catte ll (197 1) gives major emphas is to those primary ab ilities derived from 
the learning of judgmental sk ill s associated with the more abstract parts of school 
curricula and nonschool experiences, such as verbal ability and numerical abi lity. 
In the course of education and experience , these judgmental skill s become orga-
nized into a broad higher-order abi lity complex, which Cattell call s crysta lli zed 
intelligence . Other higher-order abi lities include general memory , general visu-
alization, and general retrieva l or fluency. In underscoring the increasing transfer 
power of primary abilities and higher-order abilities, Cattell (1971) likens a 
specific transferable sk ill to a " tool ," by which he means "some insightful 
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device in thinking and acting which , once picked up, enables the user to handle a 
whole group of further performances [p o 316]." He conceives of an agency or 
primary ability as a "whole tool box of cognitively consistent habits [p o 321]," 
which would make crystallized intelligence a veritable workshop of transferable 
structures of ability processes. For Cattell, crystallized intelligence comprises 
highly general abstractions that possess wider transfer effects than those of any of 
the agencies and hence displays a broad generality of useful application. 
From Cattell's (1971) description of abilities as organized complexes of trans-
ferable concepts and skills and from Guilford's (1967) formulation of abilities in 
terms of information-processing operations, it seems clear that abilities in this 
factor-analytic tradition may be conceptualized as process structures, to use 
Carroll's (1974) term, or as stable constellations of psychological processes. 
This usage is consistent with information-processing formulations in cognitive 
psychology, as exemplified by Snow's (I 980b ) conception of abilities as struc-
tures of assembly and control processes as well as performance processes and by 
Sternberg'S (1977) treatment of intellective abilities in terms of both structure 
and process. On the one hand , Sternberg characterizes abilities as task proficien-
cies- specifically, as particular constellations of information-processing compo-
nents that satisfy the requirements of a given task or type of task. On the other 
hand, he also views abilities as dimensions of individual differences- specifical-
Iy, as generalized constellations of information-processing components that form 
stable patterns of individual differences across multiple tasks or types of tasks . 
The critical concept bridging these two notions is that abilities are stable 
consistencies within individuals (across variations in setting, time, and task) that 
reliably differentiate among individuals (Messick , 1982a). The intraindividual 
pattern of abilities for a particular student is the ability structure of concern in 
educational achievement. This mayor may not include all the ability dimensions, 
or interrelate them in the same way, as in interindividual structures of between-
person differences. Nevertheless, research on the structure of individual dif-
ferences does provide many of the dimensions and associated ability measures 
for characterizing and assessing individual structures (Burt, 1949; Cattell, 1971; 
Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976, 1979; Guilford , 1967; Hakstian & Cattell , 
1974) . 
Moreover, because abilities in this view are constellations of information-
processing components operative either in a particular task or stably across 
multiple tasks , they in turn may serve as components or organizers of still more 
complex or temporally extended sequential processes, such as problem solving 
or creative production (Guilford, 1967; Messick , 1972, 1973) . Thus, functioning 
much like subroutines or prior assemblies in computer terms , abilities not only 
facilitate performance on specific tasks and enhance the learning of new tasks but 
may also serve as operational modules in higher-order psychological processes. 
Overall , then, a person's developed ability structure is conceptuali zed here as a 
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multidimensional organization of stable assemblies of information-processing 
components that are combined funct ionally in task performance, learning, prob-
lem solving, and creative production (Messick , 1972, 1973 , 1982a) . 
In educational achievement, abilities and ability structure are engaged with 
knowledge structure in the performance of subject-area tasks. Abilities and 
knowledge combine in ways guided by and consistent with knowledge structure 
to form patterned complexes that may differ by subject area, so that problem 
solving in physics, for example, appears different from problem solving in 
biology or in political sc ience. Furthermore, as expertise develops these abil-
ity- knowledge complexes may become markedly , even qualitatively, different 
by area. Thus, abilities are not revealed directly in educational achievtlrnent 
testing but rather are entai led in ability- knowledge combinations. Yet they do 
operate in achievement conjointly with knowledge, and hence ability tests and 
achievement tests will overlap considerably and correlate substantially---except 
possibly, as indicated earlier, in low-level achievement testing that primarily 
stresses information retrieval and first-order relations. Moreover, because the 
engagement of abilities is extensive and complex in high-level achievement, it 
would not be surprising to find quite high correlations at advanced achievement 
levels. For example, in a Graduate Record Examinations rescaling study, when 
19 advanced subject-matter tests were correlated with a combination of verbal 
and quantitative abilities, six coefficients were between .71 and .81, whereas 
nine were between .60 and .70 (Wallmark , 1969). 
Still, cognitive ab ilities are not the same as subject-matter achievement, even 
those representing generalized school-related learnings such as crystal lized intel -
ligence. Indeed, for many educational purposes it is important to assess them 
separately . That is, a person may fail in subject-area task performance because of 
inadequate knowledge (especially strategic knowledge), dysfunctional knowl -
edge structure , ineffective mobilization or organization of a complex of relevant 
abilities, or deficiencies in anyone of these abilities. Achievement tests tap all of 
these in concert and although they may often effectively separate knowledge 
retrieval from knowledge use, they do not provide independent assessments of 
cognitive abilities . Thus, the coordinate measurement of cognitive abilities as 
well as subject-matter achievement may contribute to the comprehensive diag-
nosis of academic difficulties. 
Cognitive abilities are independent of subject matter but they are by no means 
content-free; rather, they cut across content areas. In some instances , they may 
be specialized by type of content such as verbal , numerical, or figura l, but at 
higher orders they represent more general functions such as memory or fluency . 
The route taken to arrive at this point may have appeared to be circuitous, but it 
was a deliberate attempt to forge an explicit link between concern over the role of 
cognitive abilities in achievement testing and 50 years of factor-ana lytic work on 
the delineation and measurement of abilities. 
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Contrasting Views of Knowledge Versus Ability in 
Achievement Testing 
This view of educational achievement as a compound of developed ability and 
knowledge structures shares some important features with other conceptions of 
achievement but also entails some critical differences in substance and emphasis. 
As an instance, Ebel (1969, this volume) maintains that' 'the essence of achieve-
ment is command of useful verbal knowledge [1969, p . 66]." Ebel (1974, 1982) 
makes it clear that he is speaking not merely about amount of knowledge or 
information but about knowledge structure-that is, about the "structure of 
relationships among concepts, a structure built out of information by processes of 
thought [1974 , p. 3171." But he limits this structure specifically to verbal knowl-
edge, whereas the present formulation admits any form of knowledge, whether 
verbal or visuospatial or whatever. Ebel (1969, 1982) also stresses the usefulness 
of the knowledge, with the implication that useful knowledge is what gets built 
into the knowledge structure whereas useless knowledge is soon forgotten. In 
contrast, the present formulation stresses the usefulness of the knowledge struc-
ture as a functional system in thinking. However, the critical difference between 
Ebel's view and the present one is his explicit exclusion of general cognitive 
abi lities except for knowledge-dependent, area-specific ski lls such as adding 
fractions or formulating sentences (Ebel, 1969, 1974). This is puzzling in light of 
Ebel's insistence that achievement is the command of knowledge because, as 
Snow (l980a) has underscored, "'command' implies organization, generaliza-
tion, faci le adaptation and application of knowledge in new contexts; that is 
what, I contend, general mental abilities are! [po 43]." 
In contrast to Ebel' s exclusion of developed cognitive abi lities from achieve-
ment, Anastasi (1976, 1980, this volume) subsumes achievement under the 
rubric of developed abilities. She refers to a continuum of tests of developed 
abilities that vary in their degree of experiential specificity . Included along with 
"culture-fair" tests, tests of verbal and nonverbal intelligence, and tests of 
differentiated cognitive abilities are course-oriented achievement tests of techni-
cal skills and factual knowledge as well as broadly oriented achievement tests of 
major long-term educational goals such as the interpretation of literature or the 
understanding and application of scientific principles (Anastasi, 1976). 
The differentiation among educational and psychological tests in terms of 
experiential specificity is a helpful one, and the implication that these tests" fuse 
imperceptibly" with one another is an important caveat against misuse. For 
example, some tests designed to assess subject-matter achievement so stress the 
application of learned skills to the solution of new problems in the area that they 
appear to measure general reasoning and other cognitive ab ilities fairly indepen-
dent of factual content; whereas some other tests designed to assess general 
scholastic abi lity draw free ly on varieties of specific word knowledge and arith-
metic principles learned in school. However, the subtle implication that because 
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existing tests overlap markedly or are misa ligned with the ir constructs, therefore 
the construct distinctions are unimportant- that " the terms intelligence, apti-
tudes. abilities. and achievements are indeed different words for essentially the 
same human characteristics lEbel, 1980, p. II) "-{!oes not fo llow at all and is 
insidious in its impact on new measurement efforts. What is needed is not a 
downplaying and blurring of the construct distinctions but , rather , attempts to 
illuminate these distinctions in refined measures of knowledge structures, of 
cognitive abilities as process structures, and of ability- knowledge complexes in 
problem representation and solution . 
EXPERTISE AND APTITUDE 
It should be noted that the present conception of educational achievement is not 
tied to program or course objectives. Educational achievment in thi s view refers 
to what a person knows and can do in a subject area, not just the degree to which 
the person knows and can do what was taught. Such a narrowing of purview can 
of course be imposed and for some uses of achievement tests, such as the 
certification of curriculum mastery or the evaluation of program or course effec-
tiveness, probably should be imposed . Even here, however, one should not 
automatically preclude the assess ment of generalization and transfer in the for-
mer instance or of potential side effects in the latter. The po int is that for other 
uses of achievement tests-such as the diagnosis of academic strengths and 
weaknesses as a basis for remediation or for adaptive instruction and the predic-
tion of future attainment as a basis for selection , placement , or assignment to 
alternative treatments- the broader view may offer added value. Some examples 
of thi s added value come from a consideration of the differences between begin-
ning and experienced learners in a fi eld and between novices and experts. 
Assessing What Is Learned, Not On ly What Is Taught 
As we have seen , when students learn something spec ific, they usually also learn 
something general; that is , they tend to educe general attributes from spec ific 
instances and evolve general structures for representing and understanding new 
spec ifics. For beginning students in a fie ld , these rudimentary knowledge struc-
tures tend to be idiosyncratic , because new information is assimi lated to the 
student 's intuitions about the subject derived from everyday experiences . These 
structures or informal theories are also frequently fragmented or overextended or 
misaligned with reality . In some instances, these informal theories are simply 
vague and poorly articu lated vers ions of acceptable structures, requiring the 
progressive differentiation and reintegration of already ex isting ideas with new 
knowledge (Ausubel, 1968). In other instances, however, the student' s informal 
notions may be seriously at variance with formal theories or accepted structures, 
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in which case they constitute what Driver has called "alternative frameworks " 
(Driver, 1981 , 1982; Driver & Easley, 1978). These alternative frameworks, 
being based on student's intuitions , tend to be quite persistently embraced and 
are frequently resistant to change through instruction . 
A number of common alternative frameworks have been uncovered in science 
education in particular. For example, some beginning biology students evince a 
persistent tendency to think in Lamarckian terms (Deadman & Kelly , 1978) and 
some believe, despite instruction on photosynthesis to the contrary, that plant 
"food" comes exclusively from the ground (Driver, 1982). Some beginning 
physics students have been found adhering to non-Newtonian ideas about motion 
and to notions of impetus reminiscent of pre-Galilean dynamics (Viennot, 1979) . 
It appears that intuitions are not readily abandoned and, in particular, that scien-
tific principles that are counter-intuitive are not easily assimilated. If conceptual 
learning entai ls such radical restructurings of ideas , it is not enough to assess for 
diagnostic purposes whether or not the student knows what was taught--one 
must also assess what else the student "knows" or believes about the subject. 
A simi lar point holds for the assessment of expert- level achievement but for a 
different reason : namely , much of what is learned in the development of exper-
tise, we do not know how to teach . However, from a convergence of recent 
studies we have begun to characterize, albeit tentatively , some of the complex-
ities of developed knowledge and ability structures that constitute the power of 
expertise (Chi, Feltovitch , & Glaser, 1981; Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979; 
Glaser, 1981; Hunter, 1982; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980a, 
1980b; Rigney, 1980; Simon, 1976). Hence , we may be able to approach the 
assessment of expertise in terms of these outcomes of learning and development, 
which are beginning to become clear , rather than in terms of the objectives of 
teaching, which in the case of expert ise continue to be vague and ill-defined. 
It appears from this recent work that not only do experts know more than 
novices or have a vastly richer store of relevant knowledge in long-term memory, 
they also structure and continually restructure knowledge in more complex ways. 
In particular , experts construct complex schemas that combine some of the 
dimensions and simpler schemas used by novices into integrated funct ional pat-
terns, while at the same time discarding as redundant or irrelevant some other 
dimensions that novices attend to. Experts also develop new patterns of perceiv-
ing, thinking, and acting or what Ian Hunter (\ 982) calls "adroitly usable pat-
terned complexes." These complex abilities to perceive and apply both patterned 
relational schemas and the attendant action sequences strongly influence the 
nature of problem representations, the avoidance of irrelevancies, and the organi-
zation of performance and solution processes . Experts also develop greater speed 
and fluency of performance, implying in addition to the restructuring already 
mentioned a continual tuning of processes, the automatization of routines and 
control processes, and the shedding of redundant processes (Rumelhart & Nor-
man, 1976) . Furthermore, in contrast to novices , experts appear more capable of 
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flexible restructuring for the application of multiple perspectives to problem 
representation and solution as well as for the adjustment or replacement of 
dysfunctional initial schemas as hypotheses change. 
In addition to providing possible guidelines for the assessment of expertise, 
these findings suggest that not only do abilities facilitate the development of 
more complex abilities but so do rich and extensive knowledge structures. Thus, 
developed abilities influence the structuring and restructuring of knowledge 
whereas developed knowledge structures influence the organization and applica-
tion of abilities, leading to increasingly more complex structures of each. Al-
though the "adroitly usable patterned complexes" of ability developed by ex-
perts are inherently knowledge-dependent, some of their structural and 
functional aspects may be generalizable to the learning of other fields. For 
example, when an expert in one field attempts to learn a different subject matter, 
he or she may be more able than the ordinary novice to discern the deep structure 
of the new field, to ignore irrelevancies, and to perceive the patterned relation-
ships entailed in constructing complex schemas, even though a massive store of 
knowledge in the fi eld has not yet been acquired. If this is possible, then what we 
should mean by a generalist is not a jack-of-all trades and a master of none , but a 
jack-of-all-trades and a master of one or, preferably, two. Thus, expertise in one 
field may be aptitude for the functional mastery of another. 
Aptitudes as Facilitators and Forecasters of 
Performance 
This brings us to the construct of aptitude which , according to Snow (I 980a) , 
refers to " psychological characteristics that predispose and thus predict dif-
ferences in later learning under specified instructional conditions [p o 4 1] ." 
Again , at the outset I want to make clear that there is no necessary implication of 
innateness in this use of the term. This conception comprises two distinct but 
closely related notions of aptitude- namely , aptitude as a forecaster of learning 
or performance and aptitude as a facilitator of learning or performance (Cronbach 
& Snow, 1977) . Although the applied emphasis may be on predictiveness per se, 
the scientific emphas is-in such psychoeducational research as the study of 
aptitude-treatment interactions-is mainly on illuminating the facilitating pro-
cesses that underlie the prediction (Snow, 1980a). This may lead not only to 
better prediction but to better and more responsible use of the predictive findings . 
A compatible conception of aptitude as learning rate is also current (Carroll, 
1963; Green, 1974), but again the primary concern is with the process structures 
that underlie differences in rate (Carroll, 1974) . 
Considerable confusion arises when aptitUde tests as predictors are contrasted 
with achievement tests as measures. because achievement in a subject-matter 
area happens frequently to be quite predictive of subsequent performance in the 
same field. Subject-matter achievement is also often predictive of performance in 
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related fi elds, although somewhat less so , whereas measures of general ability 
complexes such as tests of scholastic abili ty or of crystalli zed intelligence tend to 
be more widely predictive across disparate fi elds. Furthermore, the distinction 
between developed abilities and developed knowledge structures cuts across this 
aptitude-achievement contrast , as does Anastasi's (1 976) continuum of experi-
enti al specificity and Snow 's (l 980a) pyramid of referent generality . The latter, 
consistent with the present formulation , illustrates why ability and achievement 
constructs are more readily di stingui shable both conceptually and empirically at 
more spec ific than more general levels. 
Apti tudes may be spec ific or general and so may achievements, developed 
abilities, or knowledge structures. Developed abilities and knowledge structures, 
being evolved through education and experience, are both achievements, to be 
sure . Yet they are also predictive of subsequent learning and performance, more 
broadly in the case of abilities and in more focused fashion in the case of 
knowledge structures, thereby qualifying as aptitudes as well. But the predictive 
developed ability is not the same as the subsequent performance, nor is it a 
measure of that performance . Similarly , current achievement that predicts future 
achievement is not a measure o f that later achievement. 
This confusion between prediction and measurement has led some investiga-
tors to argue that aptitudes, abilities, and achievements are " essentially the same 
human characteri stics [Ebel, 1980 , p. II) " and that aptitude, ability , and 
achievement tests are " fundamentall y similar" in what they measure (Anastas i, 
1980) . The point may be well taken in regard to many existing tests. But as 
Carroll (1 974) has pointed out , " with a definition of aptitude that identifies it 
with the present state of the individual as symptomatic of future performance, it 
is difficult to see why there should be any great difficulty in distinguishing 
between aptitude and achievement as concepts [p o 287) ." Similarly , in spite of 
high corre lations between tests of educational achievement and tests of devel-
oped cognitive abilities but in light of their differenti al responsiveness to direct 
instruction , their differential involvement in aptitude-treatment interactions, their 
different courses of development , and differences in their process and content 
components, it is difficult to see why there should be any great problem in 
di stingui shing between educational achievement and cognitive abilities as 
constructs. 
TH E FAILINGS OF FALLACIES 
We have been alerted to the jingle fallacy , whereby tests purported to measure 
the same construct are naively taken to measure the same thing, and , to the 
jangle fall acy , whereby tests purported to measure different constructs are na-
ive ly taken to measure different things (Kelley , 1927) . We now find that if tests 
purported to measure different constructs correlate highly with each other , the 
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constructs are taken to be the same thing . This might be called the jingle- jangle 
fallacy , because convergent correlational evidence , which would support jingles , 
is taken as tantamount to the absence of discriminant experimental evidence, 
which would support jangles . However, I prefer to call it the jungle fallacy 
because , by failing to maintain the distinction between constructs and their 
indicants or measures, we are in danger of reverting to the jungle of operation ism 
whereby test meaning resides in each investigator's measurement operations 
rather than in validated relational or nomological networks. 
What is needed now is what has always been needed- namely , not just the 
empirical buttressing of constructs inferred from existing measures but the devel-
opment and validation of measures attuned to constructs, especially as constructs 
evolve or change with conceptualizations of new evidence. In educational theory 
and practice today, we must recogn ize, to use Glaser's (1980) words , that "the 
study of learning appears to be taking on the characteristics of a developmental 
psychology of performance changes- the study of changes that occur as different 
knowledge structures and complex cognitive strategies are acquired, and the 
study of conditions that affect these transitions in competence [po 322]." Ac-
cordingly , in educational measurement today, we must recognize, to use Snow's 
(l980a) words, that " achievement constructs refer to complex dynamic cogni-
tive structures [p o 44] ." Hence, to better serve both theory and practice, new 
approaches to achievement measurement should be more complex, dynamic , and 
cognitive . 
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